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Abstract
We explore the relationship between regime type and country access to the Internet
at both domestic and global levels by conducting longitudinal analyses of economic,
population, and Internet data between 2002 and 2011. In particular, we investigate
how a country’s position in the global Internet network is associated with the country’s
type of political institution while attempting to take into account its economic growth
and population (so-called scale effects). Our analysis shows that liberal democracies
dominated the global Internet network both in 2002 and in 2011, followed by polyarchies
and electoral democracies. Finally, our panel regression and network analyses suggest
that it is important to consider network characteristics in investigating whether and
how a country’s regime type influences the country’s Internet adoption. We discuss
implications of these and other findings for idea flows and economic developments.
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Looking at data from the late 20th century generally, though not unequivocally, supports
the notion that richer countries tend to be democratic (Lipset, 1959; Magee & Doces, 2015).
The specifics of this relationship are complicated, though there is general agreement that
increasing political freedoms can help generate economic growth at least at low levels of eco-
nomic development. Barro’sBarro, 1996 longitudinal analysis of approximately 100 countries
between 1960 and 1990 found that when variables including rule of law, free markets, low
government consumption, initial level of per-capita GDP, and high human capital were held
constant, the relationship between democracy and economic growth was mildly negative.
One explanation is that democratization helps economic growth where there are low levels
of freedom but then begins to retard growth as levels of political freedom become at least
moderate.
In this paper we use the concept of regime type to compare the governance structures
of countries. Specifically, we use regime type as a proxy for the degree to which a given
country exhibits the characteristic of being democratic. While the notion of democracy is
in many ways a contested concept, political scientists have developed empirical measures
Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton, 2010. For our purposes, and we will say more about this in
the Data section below, we want to distinguish between various kinds of democracies ranging
from those which involve minimally competitive elections (for example, Albania) to those
which assert full equality under the law (for example, Australia). These different flavors of
democracy taken together are further distinguished from closed autocracies (minimal or no
elections; for example, Saudi Arabia) and multiparty autocracies (multiple parties but little
effective competition; for example, Tajikistan).
Technology has often been cited as a key component of economic development and it has
been argued that democratic institutions enhance the development of advanced technology.
For example, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi, 2007 argue, with some empirical support, that
political rights often associated with democratic regimes permit easy entry for new businesses
and that this can be especially important in catalyzing innovation at or near the technological
frontier in contrast with an autocratic regime in which a new entry would require central
government authorization.
For our purposes, a particularly important look at the role of technology is provided
by Paul Romer who develops an argument for the endogenous role played by technology
in economic development. In Romer, 1990 he argues that economic development results
in part from developing new ways of combining physical raw materials. For example, new
value is created when ways are found to use rare earth metals in building cell phones and
television sets. These new ideas are interesting economic objects in that they often have
properties which distinguish them from more conventional objects. We elaborate on this in
the Background section.
At a fundamental level, ideas are information. And, high speed, standards-based digital
networks are an essential medium for information flow in this networked information age
Standage, 2013. The primary current example is the global Internet. Coupled with modern
search engines, once an idea becomes available in one place it nearly instantly becomes
mirrored and locatable from anywhere with appropriate Internet access. This networking of
virtualized information has the potential to speed up the rate of technology development.
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For this to actually happen, there are infrastructure investments which must be made and
maintained. Additionally, citizens must have sufficient access to devices which can connect
to the Internet, capture information, and as pointed out in Benkler, 2006, there must be
enough slack that people are able to explore novel ways of creating new value by mutating
that information. From a political perspective, this entails relatively unrestricted access
to the Internet along with a legal system offering robust guarantees that creators of new
information will be able to capture some of the value of that information.
Countries differ in how they are integrated with the Internet. These differences are at
both the domestic (how much access do a country’s citizens have) and global (how connected
is the country to the global Internet) levels. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine
the impact of regime type on a country’s access to the Internet at both country and global
levels while controlling for some country characteristics known to influence the country’s
Internet adoption. In particular, we aim to provide insight into whether and how a country’s
regime type is associated with the country’s connections with other countries via the Internet
(global level). While previous studies examined the influence of regime type on technology
adoption or vice versaGuillén and Suárez, 2005; Seo and Thorson, 2012; Kedzie, 1997; Milner,
2006; Norris, 2001; Rød and Weidmann, 2015, little research has examined the topic at both
country and global levels. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing relevant data
from 2002 to 2011 using network analysis and panel regression. To provide a more complete
view of the relationship between regime type and Internet connectedness, it is important
to look beyond country specific variables and consider how well connected and central that
country is within the network.
2 Background
2.1 Regime Type and Internet Adoption
Whether or how forms of political institutions, regime type, influence the government’s In-
ternet adoption or whether the government’s Internet adoption affects its democratic process
has been a topic of great interest in recent years Guillén and Suárez, 2005; Seo and Thorson,
2012; Kedzie, 1997; Milner, 2006; Norris, 2001; Rød and Weidmann, 2015. Empirical and
theoretical studies in this area have presented somewhat conflicting arguments. These mainly
divide into two groups of thought. The first argues that there is a significant association
between the type of political institution and the country’s adoption of digital communica-
tion technologies such as the Internet with democratic countries being more likely to adopt
the InternetGuillén and Suárez, 2005; Kedzie, 1997; Milner, 2006. In contrast, the second
group argues that the Internet adoption does not always help a country become more open
or democratic Rød and Weidmann, 2015.
Examining data from roughly 200 countries from 1991 to 2001, Milner, 2006 found that
political institutions significantly influenced the spread of the Internet even after controlling
for alternative explanations such as economic development. In particular, Milner argued that
regime type plays an important role in this with democracies adopting the Internet at a much
faster pace than autocracies. Milner’s findings are consistent with Guillen and Suarez’s study
Guillén and Suárez, 2005 that showed the democracy score of the country was a significant
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predictor of the country’s number of Internet users and hosts. Following the so-called Arab
Spring political and social uprisings in some Middle Eastern and North African countries,
several studies emphasized the role of the Internet and digital communication technologies
in facilitating grass roots political movements Howard and Hussain, 2011; Seo and Thorson,
2012.
The Islamic Republic of Iran and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
continue to rank at the bottom in terms of both democracy and Internet adoption Free-
dom House, 2015a, 2015b. While systematic research on the countries’ Internet access and
adoption has been limited largely due to restrictions to access to these countries, there has
been empirical evidence-based reports that provide a glimpse of Internet policies in the coun-
tries. Iran’s domestic Internet policies are designed to legitimize the government’s efforts to
monitor and control its citizens’ Internet access and filter content online on a massive scale
Global Internet Policy, 2015. While Iranian President Rouhani, in the wake of his election
in 2013, promised to a shift in the domestic Internet policies, no significant policy change
has yet materialized. In the case of North Korea, one of the world’s least globally connected
countries, ordinary citizens are allowed access only to a national intranet. Global Internet
access is granted only to a small group of high-level officials and scientists.
However, others have argued that the association between the Internet and democratic
development is overstated Rød and Weidmann, 2015. For example, based on an empirical
analysis of Internet use in authoritarian regimes from 1993 to 2010, Rød and Weidmann, 2015
claimed that autocracies concerned about the domestic information environment are more
likely to introduce the Internet than other autocracies. In addition, their data showed that
movements toward democracy were more frequent in autocratic countries with low Internet
penetration. These findings led them to conclude that the Internet had no effect on political
institutions and the assumption that “the Internet fosters democratization” is overstated (p.
348).
2.2 Technology, Scale, and Ideas
Traditional activities, both public and private, designed to help produce ideas and modes of
implementing those ideas have taken the form of developing human capital through higher
education, national labs, public libraries, and private sector research and development labs.
Countries have varied considerably in the mix of public and private sector responsibility
for these. Importantly, at least through most of the 20th century, these idea development
activities have largely been carried out within national borders. That is, national policies
controlled the specific mix of public and private activities aimed at idea development Wagner,
2008; Leydesdorff, Wagner, Park, and Adams, 2013. More recently, the global Internet
providing a geographically dispersed virtual bazaar of information capable of being mutated
into new and valuable ideas plays an increasingly prominent role.
Paul Romer developed an argument for the endogenous role played by technology in
economic development Romer, 1990. He argued that ideas are information which, when im-
plemented, possibly can be used to solve a problem. For example, an idea for manufacturing
particular kind of product. However, to actually make the product that idea must be in-
stantiated in someone’s head or a program controlling a robot and applied to any necessary
material ingredients to produce a instance of the product.
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The material ingredients have fairly conventional economic properties. That is, they are
excludable as the owner of these goods can exclude others from using the good absent, say, a
payment. And they are rivalrous (my using that particular instance of that ingredient means
others cannot). Note here that excludability may depend upon a rule of law supporting
robust expectations regarding the enforceability of contracts.
Moreover, the product itself is both rivalrous and excludable. An instance of a product
can only be in one place at a time and if I possess that instance I can rightfully deny access
to others. Further, the person (or robot) responsible for implementing the idea is rivalrous
as the person (machine) cannot be simultaneously somewhere and somewhere else. However,
the value of the product is not simply a linear combination of the value of the robot together
with the value of the raw ingredients. The idea, which led to the product, is a crucial
component of the product’s ultimate value. That idea has a virtual existence apart from
its physical implementation. In other words, it is not necessarily rivalrous nor need it be
completely excludable. To some extent this may depend upon details of national intellectual
property laws which will generally vary from country to country.
Ideas, implemented in computer code, English language, or whatever representation lan-
guage, may be nonrivalrous precisely because that idea is capable of being simultaneously
implemented in any number of physical entities. Moreover, the idea can be mutated to pro-
duce “improved” products with features perhaps unimagined at the time the original idea
was developed. The nonrivalrous nature of ideas suggests that it may not always be possible
to fully exclude access to ideas. Examples of this range from ideas for developing the atomic
bomb to Steve Jobs watching a presentation of a windowing system at Xerox PARC and
going on to develop the Apple Macintosh. This ongoing process of idea sharing, mutating,
development, and commercialization helps to drive technological development.
One of Romer’s insights was, following Schumpeter, 2013, to note that once we acknowl-
edge that nonrivalrous inputs can add economic value while not being fully excludable and
assume that rational economic agents will thus have reason (incentive) for developing new
ideas, there is a rationale for making technology development endogenous to economic growth
models. The price paid for this is that the resultant increasing returns to scale means produc-
tion functions can no longer be assumed to be convex and decentralized equilibria cannot be
guaranteed to exist. This led Romer to propose a monopolist competition theory of economic
development in which ideas are both nonrivalrous and not necessarily fully excludable.
In the neoclassical theory of economic growth, ideas were treated as exogenous. Ideas just
sort of happened outside the formal growth models. Romer’s incorporating ideas within his
growth model is important since it provides agents incentives for seeking out and mutating
ideas (the incentive comes from their being able to capture privately some of the value
associated with the idea). Moreover, and importantly for our argument, it is reasonable to
think that the number of new ideas produced will be some increasing function of the number
of people trying to develop ideas. An immediate implication of this is what are generally
termed scale effects Jones, 1999. All else being equal, the larger the population of potential
idea producers, the greater the economic growth potential. The issue then becomes how to
identify that population—is it simply the count of people or, as we argue, is it better thought
of as being an index of the number of people having credible access to the existing pool of
ideas.
Summarizing to this point, there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that ideas
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drive technology development and, along with traditional capital, matter to economic growth.
Assuming Romer models of growth, there are endogenous incentives for developing and
commercializing ideas. A consequence of this is that national government policies can affect
incentives in such a way as to support the production of more ideas. Moreover, continuing
to assume scale effects, we would expect large countries, and especially large countries whose
citizens have good access to the global bazaar of ideas known as the Internet, to do better than
smaller countries. At the same time, we might expect government policies which have the
consequence of restricting citizen access to the Internet to effectively reduce the scale of that
country. The two Koreas provide useful illustration of this. South Korea, a relatively small
country in area and population, has since late last century pursued a government directed
policy of expanding Internet connectivity and providing opportunities for its citizens to study
abroad. The South Korean economy, the so-called miracle on the Han, punches well above
its weight. On the other hand, North Korea, also a relatively small country, has pursued
a policy of isolation and has permitted citizens extremely limited opportunity for Internet
access and study abroad. Its economy is one of the poorest in the world.
3 Data
The empirical analyses in this paper are based on a panel dataset of countries over the
ten-year period from 2002 to 2011. Depending upon the variables being analyzed, the panel
includes between 171 and 200 countries. The particular time period was chosen both because
of data availability and our objective of looking at the impact of regime type on Internet
connectedness. It was only around 2002 that most all countries report robust connection
with the global Internet.
The panel was constructed by combining data from several sources. Values for coun-
try population (POP), gross national income1 (GNI ), and Internet Users per 100 people
(InetUsers) measures were taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
The regime type (RegimeType) variable is that reported on in Møller and Skaaning, 2013
and available at http://ps.au.dk/forskning/forskningsprojekter/dedere/datasets/. Country
global bandwidth (Bandwidth) measures were calculated from data curated by TeleGeogra-
phy TeleGeography, 2012.
GNI figures are reported in current dollars. World Bank estimates of InetUsers are based
upon data from the International Telecommunication Union and World Telecommunica-
tion/ICT Development Report. A description of the method used to calculate Bandwidth is
in Seo and Thorson, 2015.
Our use of regime type refers to a general characterization of the governance system in a
country. Given the time period of our study, our focus is on the degree to which a country
is democratic. There have been a variety of attempts to measure democracy Munck and
Verkuilen, 2002. While there is evidence that these different measures tend to correlate with
one another, differences between them can matter Pemstein et al., 2010.
The RegimeType variable we use is fully described in Møller and Skaaning, 2013 and,
1GNI reflects the total domestic and foreign income earned by residents of a country and thus includes
a country’s Gross Domestic Product plus income earned from other countries. Data are reported in current
dollars.
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for democracies, based upon the Freedom House annual survey of electoral democracies
Møller and Skaaning, 2010. The values of RegimeType are: closed autocracy (minimal or
no elections), multiparty autocracy (existence of multiple parties even if not competitive),
minimalist democracy (political competition with uncertain outcomes), electoral democracy
(requires more rigorous electoral procedures), polyarchy (requires freedom of speech and
association), and liberal democracy (requires equality under the law). Example counties with
classification in 2011 are Iran (closed autocracy), Egypt (multiparty autocracy), Guatemala
(minimalist democracy), Indonesia (electoral democracy), Republic of Korea (polyarchy),
and France (liberal democracy).
We use the full six value RegimeType scale for much of our subsequent analysis. Figure
1 shows the distribution of RegimeType values by year for the 191 countries for which we
had measures in all ten years.2 However, there are several times that we will dichotomize
the variable into democracies and autocracies by collapsing the two autocracy categories
and the four democracy categories. For the dichotomized variable the number of democratic
countries in the panel fell slightly from 120 in 2002 to 115 in 2011. Over the same period the
number of countries categorized as autocracies increased from 71 to 76. Figure 2 shows the
distribution over the period. As can be seen in Figure 1, the number of liberal democracies
increased over the period and the number of closed autocracies decreased.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Panel Regression
As discussed above, previous research Milner, 2006 has examined the effect of regime type
on Internet adoption by seeing whether democracies tend to show higher rates of adoption
than do autocracies. Past studies generally measure Internet adoption using variables such
as the number of Internet users (normalized by population) in a country or the number of
Internet hosts (devices directly connected to the Internet) in a country Milner, 2006; Rød and
Weidmann, 2015; Guillén and Suárez, 2005. Independent variables considered have included
some combination of regime type, level of economic well-being, and population measures.
The general result is that democracies show a higher level of Internet adoption than do
autocracies. There also tends to be a scale effect using population as a proxy.
Inherent in this approach is the assumption that country level outcomes (Internet adop-
tion) are functions of country level institutions, level of development, and scale measured
by log of population. While empirical results tend to support this claim, they do not fully
account for country differences. To illustrate this we performed a simple fixed effects panel
regression Croissant and Millo, 2008 on our country data with InetUsers as the dependent
variable and per capita log(GNI), RegimeType, and log(POP) as independent variables. Con-
sistent with expectations based on prior literature, the estimated β for all three independent
variables were positive and statistically significant (in all cases p < 0.01).
2The color coding in Figure 1 will be used in subsequent visualizations to distinguish RegimeType values.
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We also consider another Internet adoption dependent variable—logged international
bandwidth per capita. Globally, international Internet bandwidth has increased from less
than 1 Tbps in 2002 to about 55 Tbps in 2011. International Internet bandwidth refers to
the amount of data that can be transferred over the Internet, across national borders, in a
given amount of time. A country’s international Internet bandwidth connection to another
country is an upper bound on direct country to country Internet traffic flow and has been
argued to be a good indicator of transnational Internet traffic flows Barnett and Park, 2005.
We will use a country’s international Internet bandwidth as a proxy for that country’s level
of connection to the global Internet as distinct from Internet users per 100 which provides
a measure of citizen connection to the Internet. This distinction could be important if, say,
a country has good international connectivity but relatively few of its citizens are able to
make use of that capacity. We computed a given country’s gross international bandwidth
by summing one half the bandwidth associated with each country with which it shares a
direct Internet connection (the one half stems from the convention of assigning each directly
connected country one half of the bandwidth in their shared connection).
We calculated each of our panel country’s total international bandwidth for each of the
years between 2002 and 2011. As a first approximation, countries with more international
bandwidth might be thought of as being heavier Internet adopters. To assess whether this
variable relates to our independent variables in the same way as did Internet users per 100,
we did another fixed effects panel regression now with logged international bandwidth per
capita as the dependent variable and the same independent variables as before (per capita
log(GNI), RegimeType, and log(POP). Results from these two models are shown in Table 1 3.
Interestingly, the RegimeType β is now essentially zero and no longer statistically significant.
Also, the population (scale) variable now has a negative sign.
[Table 1 about here.]
Does this mean regime type does not matter for Internet adoption at the international
level? One way of looking at this is to consider that the regression model is attempting to
account for country variables using a linear combination of other country variables. Such an
approach ignores the interconnectedness of the global Internet. A country’s position within
the global Internet is a function not only of what it does but also how it interconnects with
other countries and how those countries interconnect with it. The nature of these inter-
connections may be especially important when dealing with variables such as international
bandwidth, population, and GNI. These generally show a heavy right tail with means much
higher than medians. Thus the standard practice of logging them. However this still does
not take into account of country position in the Internet from a network perspective. For-
tunately, our international bandwidth data does permit such an analysis and we turn now
to that.
4.2 Network Analysis
We constructed a network of our panel countries for each of the ten years. Each of these
networks had countries as nodes with edges connecting country pairs where there existed a
3Table formatted using Hlavac, 2014
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direct Internet connection using the R package igraph Csardi and Nepusz, 2006. Isolates
(countries with no reported Internet connections with other countries) were not included in
that year’s network. Edges were weighted by the bandwidth capacity of that connection.
This resulted in a 187 country network in 2002 and grew to a 201 country network in 2011.
Figure 3 shows the basic structure of the 2011 global Internet network. There are 201 nodes
(countries). The width of the edges is roughly proportional to the log of the bandwidth
capacity represented by that edge. Some nodes have fairly high degree while others are only
connected to one other country.
As suggested above, to visualize the relationship between regime type and Internet con-
nectedness we need to look beyond country specific variables and consider how well connected
or central that country is within the network. In this paper we consider several such mea-
sures. The first is simply to count the number of countries with which a given country has
a direct Internet connection. In network terms, this is simply the degree of the country
(node). In general we might expect that autocracies would be directly connected to fewer
other countries than would democracies. This expectation is supported in Table 5. Given
the heavy tailed nature of the degree distribution we report both means and medians with
similar results for both statistics.
[Table 2 about here.]
A nodes degree simply reflects direct connections without considering the importance
of the nodes being connected to. Our second measure, eigenvector centrality, tries to take
into account the importance of the connections. The eigenvector centrality value of a node
will be higher if that node is itself connected to high-eigenvector centrality nodes and lower
if most of its connections are to low-eigenvector centrality nodes. Eigenvector centrality is
a variant of the PageRank metric originally used by Google. The particular eigenvector
centrality score we use is normalized (can take on values between 0 and 1) and weighted by
the bandwidth associated with each connection. A country’s eigenvector centrality score is
not simply a function of what it does but is also a consequence of the direct connections and
bandwidth volume of those connections held with those to whom it is connected. From our
perspective, countries with higher normalized weighted eigenvector centrality scores are, in
this sense, far more central within the network than are those with lower scores.
Figure 4 shows the same network as in Figure 3 though this time the nodes are col-
ored to reflect their regime type and node size is proportional to its nomalized weighted
eigenvector centrality score within that network. What stands out is that liberal democra-
cies dominate the high (normalized weighted) eigenvector centrality scores. The top eleven
are all democracies and all but Japan (polyarchy, rank 9) and Brazil (polyarchy, rank 11)
are liberal democracies. The first autocracy is China (multiparty autocracy) at rank 12.
The next non-democracy is Vietnam (closed autocracy) rank 55. The list is headed by the
usual suspects, Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States. Using eigenvector
centrality as a measure of connectedness to the global Internet, regime type clearly matters.
[Figure 3 about here.]
As shown in Figure 5, the results in 2002 were similar with China (multiparty autocracy)
as the highest ranking non-democracy with rank 15. Thirteen of the top fourteen were liberal
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democracies. Japan (polyarchy) had rank 10. The 2002 list was headed by the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Canada.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
The relationship between international bandwidth, Internet users, and regime type can
be seen in the bubble plot in Figure 6. Here several things stand out. First, there is
a rough linear relationship between a country’s logged international bandwidth and their
number of Internet users per 100 population. More importantly, however, the upper right
portion of the plot tends to be occupied by liberal democracies (blue in color) with high
eigenvector centrality scores (large diameter nodes). Moreover, most of these high eigenvector
centrality nodes score relatively better on Internet users per 100 than they do on international
bandwidth. A noteworthy exception is the United States whose bandwidth is considerably
greater than what might be expected from its Internet users per 100 score. Both Russia and
China (multiparty autocracies) rank lower on Internet users per 100 than their international
bandwidth might suggest. On the other hand, several Middle East autocracies (United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Quatar, Oman, and Kuwait) have Internet users per 100 scores higher
than would be predicted from their international bandwidth levels.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Thus far we have not considered the role of economic development. This is addressed in
Figure 7. While the roughly linear relationship between (logged) bandwidth and (logged)
GNI is not surprising given prior literature, the importance of position in the global network
as captured by normalized weighted eigenvector centrality again stands out. China and
Japan are notable exceptions with GNI much higher than would be expected from their
international bandwidth or normalized weighted eigenvector centrality score.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Finally, Figure 8 is similar to Figure 7 except that the y-axis is now Internet users per 100
population. In both Figures 8 and 7, blue (liberal democracy) nodes typically show greater
Internet adoption (whether measured by users per 100 or international bandwidth) though
the difference between democracies and autocracies is more distinct in the case of Internet
users with normalized weighted eigenvector centrality as a strong discriminator at the high
end of Internet adoption and GNI.
[Figure 8 about here.]
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5 Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between regime type and country access to the In-
ternet at both domestic and global levels by conducting longitudinal analyses of economic,
population, and Internet data from 2002 to 2011. In particular, we analyzed how a coun-
try’s position in the global Internet network is related to the country’s regime type while
considering its economic growth and population. Our results show that it is important to
look beyond country specific variables in this type of research and take into account how
connected or central the country is within the overall global Internet.
At the country level our results are largely consistent with prior literature Milner, 2006.
Regime type and economic development do matter for Internet adoption with richer and
more democratic countries typically showing a higher degree of adoption (as measured by
Internet users per 100) than do less democratic and poorer countries.
Our global level analysis extended the country analysis by constructing networks of inter-
national Internet connectedness and then examining how central countries were within this
network as measured by both degree and eigenvector centrality. While generally in line with
the country level analysis, network results highlight the importance of centrality especially
as related to levels of economic development.
At both the country and network levels, scale (whether measured by population, degree,
or normalized weighted eigenvector centrality) is an important discriminator. With notable
exceptions (China and India), democracies with large populations and/or high normalized
weighted eigenvector centrality scores show high levels of GNI. We speculate that citizens in
countries with high centrality and easy access to the Internet have the capacity to generate
ideas in greater numbers thus driving economic growth. This suggests that observed scale
effects may well be more a function of citizens’ level of informed access to the global bazaar of
ideas than of simple population. Testing this speculation will be a next step in our research.
Future research should look more deeply into telecommunication policies and Internet
regulations of countries over time as well as content filtering and censorship. This will help
provide a more nuanced understanding of interplay between structural access to the global
Internet and domestic Internet regulations policies and relationships of those factors with
regime type. Given the number of countries in the global Internet and the number of years
for which we have fairly complete data, there is a limit to the number of parameters that can
be included before running into over identification issues. That said, we have reported on
mixture model of country level international bandwidth development in Seo and Thorson,
2015 and anticipate examining outliers in that model with respect to the economic and
political variables discussed here.
11
References
Aghion, P., Alesina, A. F., & Trebbi, F. (2007). Democracy, technology, and growth. National
Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
Barnett, G. A. & Park, H. W. (2005). The structure of international internet hyperlinks and
bilateral bandwidth. Annals of Telecommunications, 60 (9), 1110–1127.
Barro, R. J. (1996). Democracy and growth. Journal of economic growth, 1 (1), 1–27.
Benkler, Y. (2006). The wealth of networks: how social production transforms markets and
freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Croissant, Y. & Millo, G. (2008). Panel data econometrics in R: the plm package. Journal
of Statistical Software, 27 (2). Retrieved from http://www.jstatsoft.org/v27/i02/
Csardi, G. & Nepusz, T. (2006). The igraph software package for complex network research.
InterJournal, Complex Systems, 1695.
Freedom House. (2015a). Freedom in the world 2015. interactive map, online: https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015.
Freedom House. (2015b). Freedom of the press: 2015. Freedom House.
Global Internet Policy. (2015). Chaos & control: The competing tensions of Internet gover-
nance in Iran.
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Figure 2: Regime Type by Year
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Figure 3: Global Internet 2011








Figure 4: Global Internet 2011
Note: Vertex diameters proportional to their normalized weighted eigenvector centrality,








Figure 5: Global Internet 2002
Note: Vertex diameters proportional to their normalized weighted eigenvector centrality,









































































































































































































Figure 6: Global Bandwidth, Internet Users, Regime Type, and Eigenvector Centrality; 2011

































































































































































































Figure 7: Global Bandwidth, Eigenvector Centrality, Regime Type, and GNI; 2011





























































































































































































Figure 8: Internet Users, Eigenvector Centrality, Regime Type, and GNI; 2011
Note: Points labeled with ISO3C country character code.
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Table 1: Fixed Effects Panel Regression





t = 17.50∗∗∗ t = −6.75∗∗∗
Regime Type 2.23 0.0000
t = 3.73∗∗∗ t = 1.79
log(GNI)/POP −756,332.00 −1.81
t = −5.68∗∗∗ t = −33.80∗∗∗
N 1,664 1,664
R2 0.26 0.45
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.40
F Statistic (df = 3; 1486) 172.00∗∗∗ 406.00∗∗∗
∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Table 2: Regime Type by Degree, 2011
Regime Type n median degree mean degree
1 autocracy 74 3.00 5.84
2 democracy 107 6.00 9.85
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